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Drug Markets, Fringe Markets, and the
Lessons of Hamsterdam
Lance McMillian*
Abstract
The Wire is the greatest television series of all-time. Not only
that, it is the most important. One of the most memorable story
arcs from The Wire’s five seasons is the rise and fall of
Hamsterdam—a quasi-legalized drug zone in West Baltimore.
Stories are powerful teaching tools because they marry
information and context. By seeing how the application of law
affects characters we know and care about, we become more attune
to the potential effects of legal decisions in the real world. The
story of Hamsterdam—which is essentially an attempt to
transform a black market into a fringe market—presents just such
an opportunity. When considering the various dimensions of the
fringe economy, life in Hamsterdam imparts three critical
insights:
(1) Markets arise wherever there exists market demand.
Drug dealers exist because sufficient numbers of people desire to
use drugs. When one drug dealer in The Wire is taken off the
streets through incarceration or death, another drug dealer
readily takes his place. Similarly, the fringe economy exists
because enough people perceive a need for the services it offers.
And where there is demand, there is supply. The lasting lesson is
that the fringe economy is going to exist whether we like it or not.
(2) Legalization and regulation, not prohibition, represent
the best method for controlling the negative externalities of fringe
markets. A key aspect of the Hamsterdam covenant between the
police and the drug dealers centers on its mutuality of promises.
The police promise immunity for all dealing within Hamsterdam’s
confines; the dealers agree not to deal anywhere else. In essence,
* Associate Professor, Atlanta’s John Marshall Law School. B.A.,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D., University of Georgia School
of Law.
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the dealers consent to submit to regulation in exchange for
legalization. Prohibition, conversely, precludes this type of
agreement because it drives drug dealers and others who trade in
outlawed goods into the shadows away from law’s light. Black
markets inevitably fill the void created by these outright legal
bans, transforming a regulatory problem into a law enforcement
problem. A rise in violence necessarily follows, as the suppliers of
black market goods become responsible for enforcing their own
norms in law’s absence. The lesson for policymakers is that
regulating a fringe economy can often induce better behavior from
questionable economic actors than the alternative of policing an
underground economy.
(3) Mustering the political will to provide legal sanction to
the fringe economy is a difficult, if not impossible, task.
Hamsterdam fails because Baltimore’s politicians fear that
embracing its success will lead to electoral defeat. Regulation is a
tool of nuance; prohibition is a blunt instrument. Even though the
former promotes the greater good, voters better understand the
latter. The Wire teaches that this reality presents a structural
impediment to genuine reform. In a political world where courage
is in short supply, the possibility of real change is illusory. The
lesson is that innovative thinking in handling the problems
created by the fringe and underground economies will likely meet
significant resistance at the point of implementation. Good ideas
will remain untested, and long-term problems will continue
unaddressed.
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I. Introduction
The Wire is the greatest television series of all-time.1 Not
only that, it is the most important.2 The transcendental quality of
the show lies in what it teaches those of us living in the United
States about ourselves. Even when we as a society know the right
thing to do, our decaying institutions lack the capacity to act. The
ineffectual status quo continues unabated. This feeling of
impotence is so jarring to viewers because we immediately know
it to be true: our institutions are broken.3 From this perspective,
The Wire is not just a television show; it is an expose on the slow
decline of America in the twenty-first century.
One of the most memorable story arcs from The Wire’s five
seasons is the rise and fall of Hamsterdam, detailed more fully in

1. The Wire (HBO television broadcast June 2, 2002–Mar. 9, 2008).
Tributes to the greatness of The Wire abound. See Dan Rowe & Marti Cecilia
Collins, Power Wire: Understanding the Depiction of Power in TV, 2009 J. INST.
JUST. INT’L STUD. 182, 185 (noting The Wire’s “rare combination of critical
success and cult status”). Even President Barack Obama named The Wire as his
favorite show. See Michael A. Fletcher, Barack Obama: Wire Fan, in THE WIRE:
TRUTH BE TOLD 37–38 (2009) (noting President Obama’s enthusiasm for the
show and suggesting that it stems from an understanding of the show’s
depiction of urban America).
2. Renowned Harvard sociologist William Julius Wilson credits The Wire
as the leading educational tool on the problems facing urban America: “[The
Wire] has done more to enhance our understanding of the challenges of urban
life and the problems of urban inequality than any other media event or
scholarly publications, including studies by social scientists.” Amanda
Fairbanks, Deconstructing ‘The Wire,’ N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2010, at ED4 (quoting
Wilson), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/03/education/03wiret.html.
3. See J.M. Tyree, Review of The Wire: The Complete Fourth Season
[DVD], FILM Q. 61.3, 32, 38 (Spring 2008) (“The Wire is in the business of telling
America truths about itself that would be unbearable even if it were interested
in hearing them.”).

852

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849 (2012)

Part II of this Article.4 Bunny Colvin, a high-ranking police
officer on the verge of retirement, suffers an existential crisis
prompted by the ongoing futility of Baltimore’s drug war.5 His
novel response is to create quasi-legalized drug zones, which are
quickly dubbed “Hamsterdam” by the drug dealers who populate
them.6 Colvin’s calculus is straightforward: by concentrating the
worst elements of his district in discrete locations, he improves
the quality of life for the law-abiding majority everywhere else.
The experiment proves a stunning success—until the politicians
learn of it.7 Fearful of the political backlash when news of
Hamsterdam’s existence inevitably spreads, Baltimore’s leaders
quickly shut it down and force Colvin to resign in disgrace.8 With
Hamsterdam destroyed, the drug dealers again terrorize the rest
of Baltimore. The status quo reigns once more.9
Stories are powerful teaching tools because they marry
information (knowledge) and context (application).10 By observing
how the power of law affects characters whom they have come to
4. The Hamsterdam story arc takes place during Season Three of The
Wire. See The Wire: Season Three (HBO television broadcast Sept. 19, 2004–Dec.
19, 2004) (including the episodes: Time After Time; All Due Respect; Dead
Soldiers; Hamsterdam; Straight and True; Homecoming; Backburners; Moral
Midgetry; Slapstick; Reformation; Middle Ground; and Mission Accomplished);
see also RAFAEL ALVAREZ, THE WIRE: TRUTH BE TOLD 217–71 (2009)
(summarizing each episode of Season Three and giving the contextual
information necessary to understand the episode’s part in the The Wire’s
complete narrative).
5. See The Wire: All Due Respect (HBO television broadcast Sept. 26,
2004) (containing Colvin’s reaction to the shooting of a fellow police officer
during a drug sting); see also ALVAREZ, supra note 4, at 224 (noting Colvin’s
perception of the bleakness of his expectations when he considers it a “good
night” only because a cop shot in the line of duty did not die).
6. See The Wire: Dead Soldiers (HBO television broadcast Oct. 3, 2004)
(containing Colvin’s initiation of the Hamsterdam project); see also ALVAREZ,
supra note 4, at 227 (relating Colvin’s revelation of his Hamsterdam plan to his
fellow officers).
7. See The Wire: Middle Ground (HBO television broadcast Dec. 12, 2004)
(containing Colvin’s revelation of the Hamsterdam project to Carcetti).
8. See The Wire: Mission Accomplished (HBO television broadcast Dec. 19,
2004) (containing Carcetti’s order to dismantle Hamsterdam and Colvin’s
demotion to Lieutenant).
9. Id.
10. See CHIP HEATH & DAN HEATH, MADE TO STICK: WHY SOME IDEAS
SURVIVE AND OTHERS DIE 204–37 (2d ed. 2008) (describing the role of stories in
the spread of new ideas).
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know and care about, viewers move beyond the four corners of
theory to the more dynamic and affecting experience of seeing law
play out in a way that is personally meaningful to them. Through
this humanizing process of putting a name and a face on complex
legal problems, film and television force a greater contemplation
of the potential effects of legal decisions in the real world,
painting “a picture of the law in action [and] marshaling the
power of the visual to make law more real, less abstract.”11
The story of Hamsterdam—which is essentially Colvin’s
attempt to transform a black market into a quasi-legal, regulated
market—presents an opportunity to utilize this promise of
popular culture to analyze public policy questions related to
underground and fringe economies.12 Because of their
disproportionate effect on disadvantaged communities, low-value
markets—legal and illegal—generate significant attention from
commentators and scholars.13 This Article adds to that body of
work by assessing the lessons that Hamsterdam imparts about
the various dimensions of the ongoing struggle against illegal
11. See Michael B. Kent, Jr. & Lance McMillian, The World of Deadwood:
Property Rights and the Search for Human Identity, 20 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
(forthcoming 2012) (discussing interdisciplinary potential of law and television
for understanding legal problems); see also Rowe & Collins, supra note 1, at 183
(“Fiction’s advantage over news is that it permits us to see how the outcomes are
achieved and how different characters use the power available to them in an
attempt to reach their goals.”).
12. The “fringe economy” encompasses economic actors operating on the
outer edge of legality such as “pawnshops, check cashing outlets, rent-to-own
stores, tax-refund anticipation lenders, the makers of car title pawns, cash
leasing operations and other second-tier credit providers as well.” Ronald H.
Silverman, Toward Curing Predatory Lending, 122 BANKING L.J. 483, 486
(2005).
13. See generally WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR., LET US TALK OF MANY THINGS
404 (2000) (presenting Buckley’s Oct. 11, 1995 speech “The Drug War Is Not
Working”); HOWARD JACOB KARGER, SHORTCHANGED: LIFE AND DEBT IN THE
FRINGE ECONOMY (2005); R.T. NAYLOR, WAGES OF CRIME: BLACK MARKETS,
ILLEGAL FINANCE, AND THE UNDERWORLD ECONOMY (2005); ERIC SCHLOSSER,
REEFER MADNESS: SEX, DRUGS, AND CHEAP LABOR IN THE AMERICAN BLACK
MARKET (2004); Richard R.W. Brooks, Credit Past Due, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 994
(2006); Seth Harp, Globalization of the U.S. Black Market: Prohibition, The War
on Drugs, and the Case of Mexico, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1661 (2010); Jim Hawkins,
Regulating on the Fringe: Reexamining the Link Between Fringe Banking and
Financial Distress, 86 IND. L.J. 1361 (2011); Angela Littwin, Beyond Usury: A
Study of Credit Card Use and Preferences Among Low-Income Consumers, 86
TEX. L. REV. 451 (2008); Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 855 (2007).
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drugs, in particular police efforts in urban environments to attack
the problem from the supply side through criminal pursuit of
local drug dealers. These lessons have wide relevance and
applicability, including guidance for analysts of the fringe
economy.
Three insights predominate. First, drug dealers exist because
a sufficient number of people desire to use drugs. When one drug
dealer in The Wire is taken off the streets through incarceration
or death, another drug dealer readily takes his place. Demand
creates supply.14 This never-ending pattern dooms law
enforcement efforts to disrupt the distribution chain for illegal
drugs and serves as the impetus behind the creation of
Hamsterdam.15 Similarly, the fringe economy exists because
enough people perceive a need for the services it offers. While law
can complicate a person’s decision to chase this demand through
the imposition of criminal penalties on suppliers of disfavored
products and services, it can do nothing to decrease the fact of
consumer demand in the first place. The lasting lesson is that the
fringe economy is going to exist whether we like it or not. Part II
of the Article explores the inevitability of these market forces in
greater detail.
Second, Hamsterdam teaches that regulation, not
prohibition, may represent the most effective means of containing
the negative externalities of low-value markets.16 A key aspect of
14. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 63–65 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1994) (1776) (describing the
causal effect of demand on the sale of goods offered in the market).
15. See The Wire: Reformation (HBO television broadcast Nov. 28, 2004)
(transcribing Colvin’s speech to his men, which compared Hamsterdam to beer
in a paper bag); see also ALVAREZ, supra note 4, at 224 (referencing Colvin’s
rationale for setting up Hamsterdam when Colvin gives a speech explaining
that “the corner” is the “poor man’s lounge” and that policing “the corner” would
be a Sisyphean task).
16. The black market for illegal drugs creates a whole host of negative
externalities for American society:
When the sale of a popular recreational drug is banned, wealth and
power flowing from productive capital are amplified and transferred
from the arena of competition between legitimate firms to the
monopoly control of entrepreneurs whose competitive advantage is a
willingness to break the law. The government then invests in
thwarting the criminals, who counterinvest in resistance and
subterfuge. Meanwhile, large numbers of transactions take place
without recourse to private property rights or the civil courts, leaving
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the Hamsterdam covenant between the police and the drug
dealers centers on its mutuality of promises. The police promise
immunity for all drug dealing within Hamsterdam’s confines; the
dealers agree not to deal anywhere else.17 In essence, the dealers
consent to submit to regulation in exchange for legalization.
Prohibition, conversely, precludes this type of agreement because
it drives drug dealers and others who trade in outlawed goods
into the shadows away from law’s light. Black markets inevitably
fill the void created by these outright legal bans, transforming a
regulatory problem into a law-enforcement problem.18 A rise in
violence necessarily follows, as the suppliers of black-market
goods become responsible for enforcing their own norms in law’s
absence.19 The lesson for policymakers—as described more fully
in Part III—is that regulating the fringe economy can often
induce better behavior from questionable economic actors than
the alternative of policing an underground economy.
violence as the only mechanism for adjudicating contractual disputes
and enforcing industry norms. Violence is used to take over and hold
supply routes and distribution territory, with each gangster knowing
that to succeed he must be more brutal than the gangster whom he
has just supplanted. Over time, violence and expenditures ratchet
upward, making it increasingly more expensive to bring the good to
market, exacerbating the cycle. Meanwhile, consumers whose
demand for drugs is inelastic (in some cases due to addiction) resort
to theft to pay for artificially priced drugs they can no longer afford.
The only constant in this uncontrollable spiral is a steady supply. The
only change to consumers is increased price and reduced quality.
Instead of champagne or powder cocaine, they get moonshine or
crack, the latter substances being cheaper to produce clandestinely,
more compact for transportation, and providing greater per-unit
intoxication to consumers wishing to minimize their transactions
with criminal suppliers.
Harp, supra note 13, at 1670–71. Other externalities of prohibition include “an
overcrowded prison system filled disproportionately with people of color” and
the worsening of the “AIDS crisis by ensuring the absence of clean needles for
intravenous drug use.” Noah Mamber, Coke and Smack at the Drugstore: Harm
Reductive Drug Legalization: An Alternative to a Criminalization Society, 15
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 619, 629 (2006).
17. See ALVAREZ, supra note 4, at 227 (detailing Colvin’s explanation of the
rules of Hamsterdam to his lieutenants).
18. See SMITH, supra note 14, at 63–65 (discussing how demand creates
markets).
19. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 245 (4th ed. 1992)
(noting that “drug traffickers are constrained to use violence to enforce their
contracts because they are denied the use of legal remedies”).
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Third, there exists the political element. Hamsterdam fails
because Baltimore’s politicians fear that embracing its success
will lead to electoral defeat.20 Regulation is a tool of nuance;
prohibition is a blunt instrument. Even though the former
promotes the greater good, voters better understand the latter.
Because those who operate at and beyond the edges of the
economy are not sympathetic figures, politicians that advocate
liberalized policies toward fringe economic players open
themselves up to attack by opportunistic opponents.21 The Wire
teaches—preaches even—that this reality presents a structural
impediment to genuine reform. In a political world where courage
is in short supply, the possibility of real change is illusory. The
lesson is that innovative thinking in handling the problems
created by the fringe and underground economies will likely meet
significant resistance at the point of implementation. Good ideas
will remain untested, and long-term problems will continue
unaddressed. Part IV of this Article expands on these political
realities.22
20. See The Wire: Mission Accomplished, supra note 8 (depicting how
Carcetti’s fear of political backlash led to the destruction of Colvin’s
Hamsterdam project).
21. See, e.g., ALVAREZ, supra note 4, at 204–05 (noting the damage done to
the political career of Kurt Schmoke, a former Mayor of Baltimore, after he
suggested that Americans “rethink the [drug] problem as a decriminalized
health issue”).
22. To be sure, The Wire reflects a distinct point of view, namely that of its
creators David Simon and Ed Burns, who are quick to criticize America’s
“‘dysfunctional drug prohibition,’” see ALVAREZ, supra note 4, at 205, and
intentionally used The Wire as a vehicle to rally others to their cause:
[U]ltimately, the storytelling that speaks to our current condition,
that grapples with the basic realities and contradictions of our
immediate world—these are stories that, in the end, have some
chance of presenting a social, and even political, argument. And to be
honest, The Wire was not merely trying to tell a good story or two. We
were very much trying to pick a fight.
David Simon, Introduction to RAFAEL ALVAREZ, THE WIRE: TRUTH BE TOLD 1, 3
(2009). Simon—a former journalist—and Burns—a former police officer and
school teacher—have long held an interest in the effects of drugs on inner-city
communities. See id. at 9–10 (describing the influence of their past careers on
the thought processes of Simon and Burns). Simon and Burns’s highly acclaimed
book, The Corner, tells the true year-in-the-life story of those trying to survive
the drug market in West Baltimore and concludes that “[t]he corner culture and
addiction are powerful forces—equal to or greater than all the legal barriers and
social programming arrayed against them.” DAVID SIMON & ED BURNS, THE
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The Wire resonates for so many because it authentically
exposes middle-class, white-collar observers to a world completely
foreign to them.23 The fringe economy suffers from the same
mystery.24 Like the Baltimore on display in The Wire, it exists on
the outer reaches of respectable society, certainly distant from
the lives of most of the scholars who devote attention to it.
Studying Hamsterdam in its journey from black market to fringe
market then back to black market—while not a perfect analogy to
traditional fringe markets such as pawn shops, predatory
lenders, and the like—is one way to bridge this cultural gap,
perhaps helping to better understand both the economic problems
that plague those struggling to stay afloat financially and the
political problems that block effective reform.
II. Hamsterdam
In the very first episode of The Wire, Detective Ellis Carver
surprises a colleague when he observes that it is a mistake to call
the War on Drugs a “war.” Skeptical, his friend retorts, “Why
not?” Carver’s concise response: “Wars end.”25 These words help
to establish a recurring motif—called “The Game”—that
emphasizes the unrelenting power of the status quo and the
powerlessness of institutions to change it.26 Police come and go;
CORNER: A YEAR IN THE LIFE OF AN INNER-CITY NEIGHBORHOOD 541 (2d ed. 1998).
Still, Simon and Burns do not necessarily agree on whether the Hamsterdam
experiment could work in real life. See ALVAREZ, supra note 4, at 205 (describing
Simon as a proponent of free zones while Burns is more skeptical). Nor does this
Article take a position on that question. Rather, for purposes of this Article,
Hamsterdam is a device for considering broader questions related to the fringe
economy.
23. See C.W. Marshall & Tiffany Potter, “I Am the American Dream”:
Modern Urban Tragedy and the Borders of Fiction, in THE WIRE: URBAN DECAY
AND AMERICAN TELEVISION 1, 8–9 (C.W. Marshall & Tiffany Potter eds., 2009)
(“[T]he Wire works to confound the line between truth and fiction. Its stories
scream of verisimilitude, and the authentic dialogue draws the viewer into a
sympathetic consideration of characters who live the sort of lives many viewers
will not ever have examined with careful, concerned, critical awareness.”).
24. See Silverman, supra note 12, at 486 (noting that the fringe economy is
“largely unfamiliar to middle- and upper-income consumers”).
25. See The Wire: The Target (HBO television broadcast June 2, 2002).
26. See Clif Mark, “All in the Game”: HBO’s The Wire, 7 The OXONIAN
REVIEW OF BOOKS 3 (Spring 2008), http://www.oxonianreview.org/issues/7-
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drug dealers come and go; politicians come and go. No matter.
The players change, but The Game stays the same.27 Until
Hamsterdam.
A. An Existential Cop
Major Bunny Colvin—district commander of Baltimore’s
Western District—stands on the brink of retirement.28 A major’s
pension and a high-paying security job at Johns Hopkins await.29
Despite his impressive personal accomplishments and the
financial security they provide, Colvin remains unsatisfied with
his life’s work. Looking at the state of Baltimore, Colvin reflects
on his long career, “The city is worse than when I came on. So
what does that say about me? About my life?”30 When one of his
officers, Dozerman, is meaninglessly shot on a meaningless
undercover drug buy, Colvin sadly assesses the meaning of
success in the never ending drug war that consumes his district:
“Tonight is a good night. Why? Because my shot cop didn’t die.
And it hit me. This is what makes a good night on my watch:
absence of a negative.”31
B. The Birth of an Idea
Unwilling to coast into retirement without attempting to
address the dysfunction that surrounds him, Colvin conceives the
idea of Hamsterdam—three free zones in abandoned areas of the
Western District—“away from the residential streets, away from
2/mark.shtml (last visited Dec. 29, 2011) (proposing that “the ‘game’ operates as
a metaphor for all institutions” and suggesting that “today’s problems” are the
product of our public institutions’ “internal logic” that results in self-corrupting
institutions thwarting their own goals of social change and perpetuating the
status-quo they were designed to change) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
27. See id.
28. See The Wire: Hamsterdam (HBO television broadcast Oct. 10, 2004)
(depicting Colvin lunching with Johns Hopkins University officials to discuss his
post-retirement employment as a security director at the university).
29. Id.
30. The Wire: All Due Respect, supra note 5.
31. Id.
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commercial areas, away from schools”—where drug dealers and
drug users “can go about their business without any interference”
from the Baltimore P.D.32 The impetus for this radical
experiment is Colvin’s frustration with how the rhetoric and
conduct of the War on Drugs undermines traditional notions of
policing:
Dozerman gets shot for some bullshit and that’s when the idea
of the free zone, of Hamsterdam, comes to me. This drug thing,
this ain’t police work. No, it ain’t. I mean, I can send any fool
with a badge and a gun up on them corners and jack a crew
and grab vials. But policing? I mean you call something a war
and pretty soon, everybody gonna be running around acting
like warriors. They gonna be running around on a damn
crusade, storming corners, slapping on cuffs, racking up body
counts. And when you at war, you need a fucking enemy. And
pretty soon, damn near everybody on every corner is your
fucking enemy. And soon the neighborhood that you supposed
to be policing, that’s just occupied territory.33

32. See The Wire: Dead Soldiers, supra note 6. To make this deal work,
Colvin promises fire and brimstone on any drug dealers who operate outside
Hamsterdam’s confines:
I swear to God, I have over 200 sworn personnel and I will free them
all up to brutalize every one of you they can. If you’re on a corner in
my district, it will not be just a humble—or a loitering charge. It will
be some Biblical shit that happens to you on the way into that jail
wagon. You understand? We will not be playing by any rules that you
recognize.
The Wire: Straight and True (HBO television broadcast Oct. 17, 2004).
33. The Wire: Reformation, supra note 15. To lay the groundwork for this
idea, he gives a lengthy explanation to his officers as to how the brown paper
bag revolutionized law enforcement by allowing the police to dedicate their time
to the activities most likely to yield the greatest rate of return:
Somewheres, back in the dawn of time, this district had itself a civic
dilemma of epic proportion. The city council had just passed a law
that forbid alcoholic consumption in public places, on the streets and
on the corners. But the corner is, and it was, and it always will be the
poor man’s lounge. It’s where a man wants to be on a hot summer’s
night. It’s cheaper than a bar, catch a nice breeze, you watch the girls
go by. But the law is the law. And the Western cops, rolling by, what
were they going to do? If they arrested every dude out there tipping
back a High Life, there’d be no other time for any other kind of police
work. And if they looked the other way, they’d open themselves to all
kinds of flaunting, all kinds of disrespect. Now, this is before my time
when it happened, but somewhere back in the ‘50s or ‘60s, there was
a small moment of goddamn genius by some nameless smoke hound
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C. The Crime Statistics Shuffle

Colvin and other high-ranking commanders in Baltimore’s
police hierarchy face tremendous political pressure from the
mayor and city council to lower crime numbers.34 The numbers
themselves are the key, not whether there actually is a decrease
in crime.35 Everyone knows that the numbers are fake, the
product of creative reporting that frequently mischaracterizes
felonies as misdemeanors to paint a picture more palatable to the
public. In the week prior to opening Hamsterdam for business,
Colvin refuses for the first time to play along and gives a truthful
presentation of that week’s numbers for his district.36 For this act
of honesty, Deputy Commissioner William Rawls ruthlessly and
mercilessly eviscerates Colvin in front of the rest of the
department’s high command for the rise in his statistics.37 The
unmistakable message received by everyone in the room: lower
the numbers, one way or the another.38
who comes out the Cut Rate one day and on his way to the corner, he
slips that just-bought pint of elderberry into a paper bag. A great
moment of civic compromise. That small wrinkled-ass paper bag
allowed the corner boys to have their drink in peace, and it gave us
permission to go and do police work. The kind of police work that’s
worth the effort, that’s worth actually taking a bullet for. Dozerman,
he got shot last night trying to buy three vials. Three! There’s never
been a paper bag for drugs. Until now.
The Wire: All Due Respect, supra note 5.
34. See The Wire: Time After Time (HBO television broadcast Sept. 19,
2004) (containing a scene where current Mayor of Baltimore Clarence Royce
encourages the police to get the murder and felony rates down to damage his
electoral opponent’s career).
35. See ALVAREZ, supra note 4, at 220 (explaining a scene in The Wire
where district commanders are told that felonies “must drop by five percent and
murders must be kept below 275 bodies” and Rawls says, “I don’t care how you
do it, just fucking do it”).
36. See The Wire: Dead Soldiers, supra note 6 (including the scene where
Colvin instructs his men not to cook the criminal statistics report).
37. Id.
38. That Rawls would incentivize his commanders to manipulate statistics
is par for the course in The Game, where institutions rely on spin to maintain
their own power:
The “game” operates as a metaphor for all institutions. In addition to
its role as adversary in the drug game, the police department is also
the setting for a second game of career advancement, which is
entirely controlled by appearances. Crime statistics must be shown to
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D. Transformation
With drug dealers and drug users confined to the three free
zones, the Western District undergoes an urban renaissance.
Crime drops 14%, violence lessens, the law-abiding reclaim the
streets so long controlled by drug merchants, and community
morale blossoms for the first time in ages. Police begin to do real
police work instead of chasing corner kids day after day.39 Even
the lives of addicts who descend to Hamsterdam improve when
community health organizations initiate needle exchanges, blood
tests, and condom distribution.40
Back at headquarters, Rawls—while happy for the decrease
in crime—suspiciously questions the rate of the decrease that
Colvin reports, “Seriously, Bunny, I already got the city council
asking questions about the [huge numbers drop]. We want to
please the mayor, not go to jail behind this shit.”41

be dropping, whether or not there is any real effect, and anything
which might embarrass the higher-ups must be concealed . . . . Thus,
the explicit aims of public institutions are subverted by internal
games that they set up. Even well-intentioned cops are forced to play
bureaucratic games in order to survive in their organizations.
Mark, supra note 26.
39. The inability of police to devote enough time to criminal law
enforcement is a common issue. See Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Police Paternalism:
Community Caretaking, Assistance Searches, and Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1486 n.3 (2009) (citing sources
that show that only one-fifth to one-third of police activity actually relates to
criminal law enforcement).
40. A health-care worker treating the citizens of Hamsterdam expounds on
the positive public health benefits of having so many drug addicts concentrated
in the same place: “From a public health perspective, there are amazing things
happening in the free zones: needle exchanges, blood tests, condom distribution.
Most of all, we’re interacting with an adverse community that is largely elusive.
We’re even talking some of these people into drug treatment.” The Wire: Middle
Ground, supra note 7.
41. The Wire: Moral Midgetry (HBO television broadcast Nov. 14, 2004).
Emblematic of the Orwellian nature of crime statistics reporting, Colvin only
finds himself on the receiving end of Rawls’s disapproval when he reports the
truth, whether good or bad.
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E. The Dark Side of Success

The revitalization of west Baltimore is not without costs.
Outside Hamsterdam, the streets of the Western District are
quiet and peaceful. Inside the free zones, however, horror reigns
despite the best efforts of health officials—open and notorious
drug use, overdoses, reckless sex, hopped-up junkies, crack pipes,
drug needles, nervous suburban kids driving through to pick up
supply, no drinking water, no toilets, no electricity, no heat. The
Deacon, one of Colvin’s closest friends, chastises Colvin for
creating “a great village of pain.”42 Colvin defends himself, “Look,
they ain’t no worse off than they were when they were scattered
all over the map. Now they’re just in one place, that’s all.”43 The
Deacon is not impressed: “And that place is hell.”44
F. Councilman Tommy Carcetti
Councilman Tommy Carcetti is an ambitious white man who
wants to be mayor in a majority-black city. He sees crime as the
issue that can make this goal a reality. In fact, it is Carcetti’s
public posturing on this issue that intensifies Rawls’s focus on the
crime stats for each of his commanders. When a skeptical
Carcetti learns of the precipitous drop in crime in the Western
District, Carcetti goes to Colvin for an explanation. Colvin takes
the councilman for a tour, and Carcetti sees for himself that the
progress Colvin has made is very real. Then Colvin says, “Let me
show you the ugly.”45 Carcetti walks through Hamsterdam, sees
the mayhem, and realizes the political opportunity before him.46
He faces a choice: embrace the very real drop in crime for the
good of Baltimore or promote his own career by exposing
Hamsterdam to the media? He chooses himself. Cameras
converge on the free zones, and Carcetti gives interviews decrying
42. Id.; Richard Price, the screenwriter for this episode, explains that the
dark side of Hamsterdam shows “how quickly utopian visions can create
dystopic hells.” ALVAREZ, supra note 4, at 251.
43. The Wire: Moral Midgetry, supra note 41.
44. Id.
45. The Wire: Middle Ground, supra note 7.
46. Id.
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the anarchy behind him.47 The death of Hamsterdam begins, but
Carcetti’s career soars. Eventually he becomes mayor, then
governor.48
G. Mayor Clarence Royce
When Mayor Clarence Royce first learns of Hamsterdam’s
existence, the audience—conditioned from watching Royce’s
cynical maneuvers over the first three seasons of The Wire—
expects him to react quickly to shut it down for the sake of
political appearances. Royce, however, becomes intrigued by
Hamsterdam’s success and debates with his advisors whether
there is a way to continue Colvin’s experiment.49 The more
politically minded advisers plead with Royce that entertaining
the idea of Hamsterdam is political suicide.50 Royce remains
curious, though, until the spectacle of the free zones becomes
public. Watching news reports of the chaos and the corresponding
opportunity these scenes afford his political rivals, Royce
immediately understands the futility of his attempt to somehow
make Hamsterdam politically viable. His instantaneous reaction:
“What the fuck was I thinking?”51
H. The Fall of A Good Man
The aftermath is fierce and all centers on Colvin. Rawls
publicly lambasts him as “amoral, incompetent, and unfit for
command” and said that he did what he did “without properly
informing his superior offices and without regard to the criminal
statutes he was sworn to enforce, . . . disgracing himself and his
47. See The Wire: Mission Accomplished, supra note 8.
48. See The Wire: Unto Others (HBO broadcast television Oct. 23, 2006)
(depicting Carcetti’s election as mayor); The Wire: –30– (HBO broadcast
television Mar. 9, 2008) (portraying Carcetti’s gubernatorial election).
49. See The Wire: Middle Ground, supra note 7 (including a scene where
Mayor Royce ponders Hamsterdam, saying, “a fourteen percent decline in
felonies citywide and I might be untouchable on this. We need to see if there’s
some way to keep this thing going without calling it what it is”).
50. Id.
51. The Wire: Mission Accomplished, supra note 8.
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command.”52 Colvin’s retirement is downgraded from a major’s
pension to a lieutenant’s pension, and the plush job with Johns
Hopkins is no more. But Colvin has no regrets: “I just did what I
did. Felt right. I’m fine with that.”53
I. Tearing Down Hamsterdam
Mayor Royce immediately provides instructions to destroy
Hamsterdam and to do so in a very public way to give himself
political cover. An army of police surrounds the free zones, and
Rawls gives the order, “Over the top, gentlemen.”54 Mass arrests
follow, as dealers and junkies find themselves rounded up and
placed on buses to be taken away. Camera crews capture the
spectacle in all its glory. The message to the public: the police are
on the case. The next phase is the actual physical demolition of
Hamsterdam. In Rawls’s words: “Come tomorrow, the television
reporters get nothing they can stand in front of.”55 Bulldozers move
in, and all that is left of Hamsterdam is a pile of rubble. After a
brief respite, The Game is back and as strong as ever.
III. Hamsterdam and the Inevitability of Markets
Economics 101 teaches that demand and supply meet each
other to create market equilibrium.56 In the context of the drug
war, the most important application of this truth—and the reason
enforcing the prohibition on illegal drugs has proven so vexing a
problem of public policy—centers on the following reality: People
want drugs.57 Colvin’s realization that he was powerless to stop
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. SMITH, supra note 14, at 65 (noting that “the quantity of every
commodity brought to market naturally suits itself to the effectual demand” and
that it is in the suppliers’ interest not to exceed that demand, and in the buyers’
interest not to have a shortage of goods).
57. See Harvey Rishikof, Long Wars of Political Order—Sovereignty and
Choice: The Fourth Amendment and the Modern Trilemma, 15 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 587, 590 (2006) (“The foes in the War on Drugs provide a service and
product that American and European citizens are demanding.”).
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this market force leads him to contemplate alternatives to the
tried-and-failed police round-up strategies of the past. The first
lesson, therefore, that Hamsterdam teaches about low-value
markets is this: Markets arise wherever there exists market
demand.
In the universe of The Wire, however, the strategy of
decreasing the market demand for drugs goes largely
unaddressed.58 Instead, the default position of the Baltimore police
is to attack the drug problem from the supply side by taking out
the drug dealers that populate the city’s street corners. The
success of this philosophy depends on whether the threat of arrest
and subsequent imprisonment will be enough to deter potential
replacements for the corner vacancies created by these arrests.
And therein lies the rub. Deterrence simply does not work. As a
result, the availability of willing workers greatly exceeds the
capacity of the police to remove dealers from the street.
The reasons for this steady supply of drug labor are easy to
understand from an economic perspective. There are two options
for youth growing up in high-crime, high-drug areas such as
Baltimore: (1) become a part of the drug trade (Choice A) or
(2) pursue other life opportunities (Choice B). There is no third
choice. It is easy for those of us living outside the inner city to
confidently assert that Choice A is obviously bad. But Choice A
does not exist in a vacuum. The question is not: is Choice A bad?
Rather, the question is: is Choice A better than Choice B? In other
words, the value of becoming a drug dealer—including the risks of
imprisonment and death—cannot be assessed without determining
the value of the opportunities prospective drug dealers give up by
living outside the bounds of the law.59 Sadly, the reality is that the
lack of perceived value of Choice B makes it economically rational
for many people to join the drug trade:
It is easy enough to say that ‘crime doesn’t pay,’ but the real
question is: Does not pay whom—and compared to what? It is
58. One notable exception is the five-season journey of Bubbles, a heroin
junkie and police informant, who finally becomes clean by series’ end after many
starts and stops. See The Wire, supra note 1.
59. See Price V. Fishback, Ryan S. Johnson & Shawn Kantor, Striking at
the Roots of Crime: The Impact of Welfare Spending on Crime During the Great
Depression, 53 J.L. & ECON. 715, 732 (2010) (explaining the link between
employment prospects and crime).
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doubtful Bill Gates could have done nearly as well as he has by
becoming a burglar or even a hit man for organized crime, but
those who pursue these criminal occupations are unlikely to
have had the same alternatives that Bill Gates had because of
his particular talents and circumstances. Given the low
educational levels of many who become career criminals, crime
may well be their best-paying option. Given the short time
horizons of many of those who make crime their occupation—
especially young people and people from lower social classes—
such things as selling drugs may be very lucrative in stage one,
whether or not it leads to prison in stage two or perhaps never
living to see stage two.60

In light of the lack of attractive opportunities elsewhere for
potential drug players to invest their lives, the police-the-corners
strategy that seeks to remove drug dealers from the streets seems
doomed from the start. Take one dealer off the street, and another
will take his place for no other reason than the fact that he has
nowhere else to go.61 Indeed, that the very real risk of death itself
does not deter new foot soldiers from serving in the drug war
60. THOMAS SOWELL, APPLIED ECONOMICS: THINKING BEYOND STAGE ONE 47
(2004). Just as a dollar today is more valuable than a dollar tomorrow, the drive
for satisfaction in the present drives many criminals to discount the costs of
prison in the future. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal
Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1214 (1985) (observing that “a criminal . . . will
value his future consumption, which imprisonment will reduce, less than his
present consumption”). To the extent that a young person believes that he will
die young anyway, the valuing of present preferences will only accelerate.
61. Elijah Anderson ties the lack of meaningful economic opportunities to a
broader sense of alienation that makes many in the inner city easy prey for
recruitment by drug dealers:
It must be continually underscored that much of this violence and
drug activity is a reflection of the dislocations brought about by
economic transformations . . . . [W]here the wider economy is not
receptive to these dislocated people, the underground economy is . . . .
[T]he facts of race relations, unemployment, dislocation, and
destitution create alienation, and alienation allows for certain
receptivity to overtures made by people seeking youthful new recruits
for the drug trade.
ELIJAH ANDERSON, THE CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY, VIOLENCE, AND THE
MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY 120 (2000); see also James Braxton Peterson,
Corner-Boy Masculinity: Intersections of Inner-City Manhood, in THE WIRE:
URBAN DECAY AND AMERICAN TELEVISION, supra note 23, at 110 (“From the
corner-boy perspective, at the crossroads of lack and desire, selling drugs is no
different from selling cigarettes or alcohol except that some trades are
arbitrarily deemed legal and others are not.”).
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undermines any claim that increased criminalization efforts—
including an even greater emphasis on incarceration62—will stop
the ready supply of supply-side labor willing to work the corners of
Baltimore and elsewhere.63
Instead of investing time and energy into making Choice A
less attractive, a more compelling supply-side answer would be to
increase the meaningful opportunities associated with Choice B.64
That solution, however, involves fixing the seemingly intractable
problem of inner-city schools, which is the tragic subject of The
Wire in Season Four—the single greatest season of television
history to date.65 And even if a solution to the education problem
62. Incarceration appears to represent the status quo in drug enforcement.
In 1990, there were 58,659 individuals under the jurisdiction of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons for drug-related offenses. In 2009, that number had almost
quadrupled to 206,784. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL STATISTICS 2003 tbl.6.0023.2009, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/
pdf/t600232009.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2012) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
63. See Rishikof, supra note 57, at 604 (“In the world of drugs, personnel
replacement, even with long-term incarceration, has been easy.”); see also
Mamber, supra note 16, at 632 (noting that “the incarceration of street-level
dealers, kingpins, and foreign producers only incentivizes others to replace
them, because the market maintains its attractiveness”).
64. Nobel laureate Gary Becker expands on this idea by observing that
there are more ways of stopping crime than merely relying on a law and order
framework:
[T]he economic approach to crime does not suggest a focus on law and
order to reduce crime. It also encompasses other more fundamental,
or indirect, ways to attack crime. There’s no question that we should
devote resources to improving the opportunities in the legal sector for
teenagers, the poor, and other groups who are more likely otherwise
to turn to crime. One action that I think is important for improving
opportunities is to improve the qualities of schools, especially in inner
cites.
Gary S. Becker, The Economics of Crime, 12 CROSS SECTIONS 8, 15 (1995).
65. The website Metacritic, which compiles rankings of television critics
across the country, ranks Season Four of The Wire as the greatest television
season of all-time with a rating of 98 out of 100, including 17 out of 21 perfect
scores. See The Wire: Season 4, METACRITIC.COM, http://www.metacritic.
com/tv/the-wire/season-4/critic-reviews (last visited Jan. 11, 2012) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). Season Four tracks the lives of four
eighth-grade boys in West Baltimore—Dukie, Michael, Randy, and Namond.
Watching their journey unfold is touching, infuriating, depressing, and deeply
affecting all at the same time. See The Wire: Season Four (HBO television
broadcast Sept. 10, 2006–Dec. 10, 2006).
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could be crafted, the desired effect on supply may not materialize.
Enhancing the attractiveness of nondrug-related opportunities
increases the price that would-be drug dealers would demand for
their labor.66 Would the market meet this demand? Probably. The
reason: Addicts, by virtue of their addiction, are insensitive to price
and will likely pay enough money to make supply of drugs
economically attractive for drug dealers.67 Therefore, approaching
the problem from the supply-side fails once again.68
Because markets arise whenever there exists market demand,
eliminating the market for illegal drugs requires taming the desire
for drugs from the demand side. For this reason, Simon and Burns
66. Stated differently, the opportunity cost of forgoing these new,
legitimate prospects becomes higher.
67. See Harp, supra note 13, at 1670 (stating that “there are good reasons
to believe that demand for drugs is inelastic with respect to the ‘tax’ of
illegality”). Nevertheless, the concept of satisficing—which holds that “rather
than selecting the ‘best’ alternative, people select the first option that meets
their ‘aspiration level,’ some satisfactory minimum threshold”—suggests that
not all would-be drug dealers would seek to maximize their welfare by chasing
the higher profits available to them in the drug trade. See Laura Miller, Election
By Lottery: Ballot Order, Equal Protection, and the Irrational Voter, 13 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 373, 384–85 (2010) (defining “satisficing”). Instead, the
improved availability of legal means to achieve an acceptable quality of life—
i.e., the “satisfactory minimum threshold”—would no doubt compel many more
individuals than do currently to live within the bounds of the law. Id. A classical
economist would counter, however, that as long as demand for drugs is truly
inelastic, this movement away from illegality becomes self-defeating, as scarce
labor increases the market price for such labor, which consequently would
attract the necessary amount of labor needed to work the corners. Regardless of
how these economic theories would play out in the real world, the deplorable
state of schools and family structures in high-crime areas means we are,
unfortunately, at least a generation away from providing the minimum level of
meaningful alternatives that the choice of satisficing requires.
68. Here, I am only talking about supply-side solutions on the local level at
the point of retail distribution. A different supply-side approach focuses on
preventing drugs from entering the country in the first place. Of course,
experience has shown that these efforts fail as well:
Drug interdiction efforts have failed to reduce drug availability in the
United States and as efforts to target drug production in certain
countries increase, new suppliers and drug trafficking organizations
have emerged to replace displaced drug producers. Over the years,
drug interdiction efforts have also failed to destabilize America’s
illegal drug market since drug prices remain low and drug purity
levels remain at all time highs.”
Margarita Mercado Echegaray, Drug Prohibition in America: Federal Drug
Policy and Its Consequences, 75 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1215, 1273 (2006).
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believe that “a societal—if not legal—acceptance of the drug
problem as a health issue and not a problem for law enforcement is
the only way to begin.”69 As part of this shift in emphasis, they
urge “‘using the resources of the drug war to economically
reintegrate one America with the other.’”70 Because the market for
illegal drugs arises because of demand, this focus on the drug user
is sound.71 Still, the knowledge that only a demand-side solution
can quell the market for illegal drugs does not mean that crafting
such a solution becomes any easier, and it would be inaccurate in
any event to view Hamsterdam as a policy designed to decrease
consumer demand for illegal drugs.
Bunny Colvin’s twofold mission was something else entirely:
(1) to free up the time of his officers to devote more energy to
community policing and real police work and (2) to contain drug
dealing by limiting it to the free zones, away from the residential
and business areas in his district. Colvin’s intent, however, does
not tell the whole story. By concentrating drug users in a few
places, Hamsterdam allows the medical community to locate and
help at-risk people in desperate need of assistance. This vision
contends that legalization’s trade-off of a net increase in drug use72
for increased public health access to drug users is a trade worth
making.73 Is this view correct? That question is for others to
answer.
69. ALVAREZ, supra note 4, at 205.
70. Id. At this point, supply-side and demand-side solutions for dealing
with the drug crisis perhaps converge in that enhanced economic opportunities
for at-risk communities simultaneously decrease the incentives of individuals to
join the drug business and provide a hope for the hopeless that may ward off a
descent into drug use.
71. Incarceration of users is another demand-side solution that has proven
ineffective. One can surmise that the same demons that prompt one to become a
junkie lead to indifference toward imprisonment. In economic terms, the present
value of consuming drugs at the moment of use is so overpowering that it dwarfs
any concerns about future imprisonment in the mind of the drug user.
72. Legalization of drugs would certainly increase drug consumption, at
least at the recreational level. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 245 (noting that
“the demand for addictive drugs appears to be elastic rather than inelastic”).
The risk that legalization of drugs would serve to spike hard-core drug use—and
the negative individual and societal consequences that undoubtedly would
follow—may very well outweigh the benefits, if any, obtained through
decriminalization. Weighing that balance is far beyond the scope of this Article.
73. The public health benefits are not limited to treating addicts for their
addictions. Access to addicts also helps to minimize the spread of AIDS. As
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The dynamics of drug markets on display in this analysis has
relevance for students of the fringe economy. Like the choice to use
drugs, deciding to utilize the services of fringe economic players
screams out, “Bad idea.”74 Consumer advocates and scholars
present a compelling case concerning the financial toll the fringe
economy exacts on its customers.75 Yet, just as millions continue to
use drugs in the face of their seeming negative utility, resort to the
products and services of the fringe economy remains brisk.76
Demand, for whatever reason, persists.77
Mamber observed:
The current zero-tolerance criminalization policy has created a
catastrophic public health crisis. Without needle exchange programs
and access to clean needles, the AIDS epidemic continues to spread.
Thirty-six percent of AIDS cases in the United States can be traced
back to intravenous drug use. Syringe exchange decreases risky
injection behavior by as much as 73%.
Mamber, supra note 16, at 637.
74. An example of the seeming illogic sometimes at work here is the
pursuit of payday loans by people who otherwise have money available to them.
See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 45 (2008)
Another recent study . . . found that a majority of payday loan
applicants had more than $1,000 available in liquid assets. While
paying a 400% interest rate may be rational, absent other options,
under conditions of extreme financial distress, it is very difficult to
rationalize when the borrower can draw on substantial liquid assets.
75. Id. at 44–45 (payday loans); Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The
Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking
System and Its Challenges to Current Thinking About the Role of Usury Laws in
Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 605–10 (2000) (fringe lenders); Ronald Paul
Hill, Stalking the Poverty Consumer: A Retrospective Examination of Modern
Ethical Dilemmas, 37 J. BUS. ETHICS 209, 214–15 (2002) (fringe lenders); Mann
& Hawkins, supra note 13, at 881–82 (payday lending); Michael A. Stegman &
Robert Faris, Payday Lending: A Business Model That Encourages Chronic
Borrowing, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 8, 19–21 (2003) (payday lending); Amanda Quester
& Jean Ann Fox, Car Title Lending: Driving Borrowers to Financial Ruin,
CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA 6–7 (Apr. 2005), available at
www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/driving_borrowers_rpt.pdf (title pawns).
76. See Jim Hawkins, Renting the Good Life, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2041,
2087 (2008) (“It has been well documented that demand for consumer credit is
constant.”); Todd J. Zywicki, Consumer Use and Government Regulation of Title
Pledge Lending, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 425, 425 (2010) (noting growth in
recent years).
77. Part of the reason consumers resort to the fringe economy is that doing
so is sometimes rational. See Midwest Title Loans, Inc. v. Mills, 593 F.3d 660,
664 (7th Cir. 2010):
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As Hamsterdam teaches, the persistence of this demand
means that a market—in one shape or another—will arise to meet
this need.78 When contemplating how to handle the problems
posed by the fringe economy, policymakers must be ever mindful of
this reality. This realization is important because the natural
instinct may be to view questionable businesses that operate on
the fringe as being the great driver of the ills that plague those on
the lower end of the economic ladder. Fringe businesses, however,
are a symptom, not a cause. Removing this symptom, and leaving
undisturbed the core reasons that drive people to the fringe
economy in the first place, will not produce lasting change. Why?
Because prohibition does not kill the market for services offered in
the fringe economy. It only moves the market underground. Nor is
such subterranean movement all that unique, as the black market
in the United States currently flourishes:
[T]here is more to the U.S. economy, much more, than meets the
eye. In addition to America’s famous corporations and brands,
the invisible hand has produced a largely invisible economy,
secretive and well-hidden, with its own labor demand, price
structure, and set of commodities. “Black,” “shadow,”
“irregular,”
“informal,”
“illegal,”
“subterranean,”
“underground”—a variety of adjectives have been used to
describe this other economy. Although defined in numerous
ways, at its simplest the American underground is where
economic activities remain off the books, where they are
unrecorded, unreported, and in violation of the law. These
activities range from the commonplace (an electrician
demanding payment in cash and failing to declare the payment
as income) to the criminal (a gang member selling
methamphetamine). They include moonlighting, check kiting,
and fencing stolen goods; street vending and tax evading;
employing day laborers and child laborers; running
sweatshops and chop shops; smuggling cigarettes, guns, and
An annual interest rate of 300 percent is astronomical. But a person
who borrows $5,000 at that rate and repays it two weeks later pays
only $577 in interest, and the loan may have enabled him to avert
foreclosure on his house, or some other dire event that would have
cost him more than $577.
78. In this way, drugs are just like any other commodity in a capitalist
economy. See Jason Read, Stringer Bell’s Lament: Violence and Legitimacy in
Contemporary Capitalism, in THE WIRE: URBAN DECAY AND AMERICAN
TELEVISION, supra note 23, at 125 (arguing that “[i]n The Wire, the illegal drug
trade serves as a sustained allegory for capitalism”).
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illegal immigrants; selling fake Rolexes, pirating CDs.
Economists disagree about the size of the underground
economy and how to measure it. There is general agreement,
however, on two points: America’s underground economy is
vast—and most of its growth occurred in the past thirty
years.79

Like the market inevitability that prompted Colvin to give
birth to Hamsterdam, this litany of black-market operations
demonstrates the power of markets to burst through any walls
that law attempts to use as a means of blocking their growth.80
Markets—legal or illegal—arise whenever market demand exists.
Fringe-economy policymakers should, therefore, be extremely
cautious in fashioning supply-side solutions that call for
prohibition.81
This caution does not necessarily mean that prohibition is
never appropriate, only that the market-shifting consequences of
prohibition should be factored into the judgment-making
process.82 For example, a market exists for trafficking humans,
including children.83 Given the vast human costs imposed by this
deplorable practice and the force used to perpetuate it,
prohibition of this market is the only choice any legitimate
government can make.84 That said, experience reveals that
79. SCHLOSSER, supra note 13, at 4.
80. That these unsanctioned markets have exploded in recent times is not
surprising because “[d]ecentralization and the advance of technology has
revolutionized life at all levels and pushed power downwards to individuals.”
Lance McMillian, The Death of Law: A Cinematic Vision, 32 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. 1, 32 (2009). This movement of power away from the state toward
the individual naturally benefits, on average, those who want to engage in
underground activities. The Wire itself derives its name from the wiretapping
efforts the police use in their attempts to arrest the drug dealers. As the seasons
of the series progress, the ever-greater technological sophistication of the
dealers makes the work of the police—especially as they operate under the
constraints of the Constitution—harder and harder.
81. See infra Part III (discussing the need for caution in calling for supplyside solutions using prohibition to address the fringe economy).
82. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 224–25 (arguing that “optimal criminal
sanctions” require deterring criminal behavior by making the prohibited activity
so costly that an offender “is made worse off by committing the act”).
83. See Jonathan Todres, Moving Upstream: The Merits of a Public Health
Law Approach to Human Trafficking, 89 N.C. L. REV. 447, 456 (2011)
(estimating that four million people are trafficked annually).
84. See id. at 459 (“[L]aw has an expressive function, and criminal law on
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prohibition of human trafficking has not been as effective as one
would hope.85 Similarly, while prohibition may be a desirable
method for dealing with certain features of the fringe economy,
policymakers should not fool themselves that banning a practice
via legislative fiat magically solves the problem they seek to
address.86 Demand continues—and supply thereby follows—even
after legal markets become illegal ones.87
IV. Hamsterdam and the Futility of Prohibition
The first lesson that Hamsterdam teaches is that markets
are inevitable whenever demand for them exists.88 So what do we
do with this information? Even though demand-side solutions
theoretically hold out the best promise of success—after all,
eliminate demand and you eliminate the market—reality must
intervene when crafting answers to entrenched problems.89 And
the reality is sobering. The market for drugs, the market for
check-cashing services, the market for car-title pawns, the rentto-own market, the market in human trafficking—none of these
markets are going anywhere in the foreseeable future.90 Because
markets exist wherever there is demand, and demand for
disfavored markets figures to remain strong for the foreseeable
human trafficking expresses a societal view that such acts are deplorable and
unacceptable.”).
85. See id. at 451 (“More than a decade of concerted [law-enforcementcentric] efforts by governments, international organizations, and civil society
has produced little real progress in terms of reducing the incidence of human
trafficking.”).
86. See KARGER, supra note 13, at 198–99 (arguing that “choking out [the
fringe economy] sector would only create an unfair advantage for mainstream
financial institutions that would be likely to use this opportunity to institute
their own brand of predatory economic activity”).
87. See NAYLOR, supra note 13, at 42 (noting that with supply-side
regulation, such as prohibition, “it is rare, perhaps impossible, to find a black
market successfully tamed”).
88. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
89. See KARGER, supra note 13, at 18–27 (identifying specific factors that
have increased demand for fringe-market products, including welfare reform,
immigration, and the Internet).
90. See Brooks, supra note 13, at 995 (“Pawnbrokers and other casual
creditors have been drawn to cities as long as there have been cities.”). Many of
these markets have a timeless quality to them. Id.
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future, the critical policy question centers not on how to rid
society of these markets, but rather on the best way to contain
their negative effects.91
Hamsterdam’s uniqueness lies in how Bunny Colvin answers
this question in the context of the never-ending drug war. The
brief success of Colvin’s quasi-legal, free-zone approach underlies
the second lesson that Hamsterdam teaches: Legalization and
regulation, not prohibition, represent the best method for
controlling the negative externalities of low-value markets.
Colvin’s key insight on how to negate the effects of drugs in
his community centers on one word: containment.92 But
containment as a strategy faces significant obstacles in a world
where the police chase drug dealers into the shadows. By
bringing the dealers into the light by legalizing their activities
within the free zones, Hamsterdam encourages the dealers to
contain themselves and submit to the regulations Colvin sets out
for them.93 The dealers accept this deal because it spares them
from the threats of imprisonment, supply disruptions, and violent
turf wars.94 Through this process, West Baltimore is
transformed.95 Dealers are happy; junkies are happy and receive
the medical attention they need; the law-abiding of the
community are happy; violence abates; and the police return to
the business of real police work.96
91. See id. at 999 (suggesting that changes such as increasing the flow of
information in fringe economy practice would decrease the sector’s negative
effects).
92. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (explaining that Colvin’s
strategy involved containing local drug dealing to “three free zones,” known as
Hamsterdam).
93. See supra note 32 (containing Colvin’s direct address to local drug
dealers, wherein Colvin explicitly promises that the police will not interfere with
drug dealing that occurs within Hamsterdam).
94. Supra note 32 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 39, 72–73 and accompanying text (describing the
positive effects resulting from Colvin’s Hamsterdam).
96. Id. This last point may be the most important to Colvin as he winds
down his long career as a police officer. Colvin’s frustration that political
decisions undermine the real work of the police—thereby harming the rest of
society—is a recurring theme of the series. See Ryan Brooks, The Narrative
Production of “Real Police,” in THE WIRE: URBAN DECAY AND AMERICAN
TELEVISION, supra note 23, at 70 (observing that The Wire “stages a series of
conflicts between the rank-and-file and the brass as the conflict between ‘good
police work’—which connotes pursuing order in reality . . . —and pursuing order
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This metamorphosis is not all joy and sunshine, however.
The free zones themselves are dens of chaos and depravity.97
Freed from any fear of legal sanction, the inhabitants of
Hamsterdam openly debase themselves, choking on the freedom
that Hamsterdam offers.98 This transparency eventually reaches
the media, and the ugliness of drug use is on display in its full
horror.99 Public revulsion at the spectacle leads to repression, and
the remnants of Hamsterdam are bulldozed into obscurity.100
In this way, the story of Hamsterdam shows the good and the
bad, presenting the audience with this choice: should drugs be
treated as a regulatory problem or a law-enforcement problem?
Neither solution is perfect. The costs of the drug war are
immense; the costs of legalization—increased drug use, most
notably—are very real, as well.101 The absence of an ideal option,
in appearance only, a narrative designed merely to send messages to specific
audiences”).
97. See The Wire: Moral Midgetry, supra note 41 (depicting increased
criminal activity and concentration of drug use in Hamsterdam).
98. Id. In this episode even the local drug dealers voice their anger toward
the police for not protecting them from armed robbery within Hamsterdam. Id.
A local deacon, upon observing Hamsterdam for the first time, calls the zone “a
great village of pain.” Id.
99. See The Wire: Mission Accomplished, supra note 8 (depicting the
media’s coverage of Hamsterdam and the resulting outrage from communities
and politicians over Colvin’s experiment).
100. Id.
101. See STEPHEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA’S LONGEST WAR:
RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS 1 (1993) (identifying the
“difference between the costs of drug use per se and the costs of efforts to
prevent drug consumption” and suggesting that “[m]ost of the current rhetoric
obscures the difference”). Former drug czar Bill Bennett stands as one of the
most prominent voices against legalization:
Starting with the basics, keeping drugs illegal is one of the best ways
to keep drugs out of the hands—and brains—of children. We know
three things here: First, children who don’t use drugs continually tell
us one of the reasons they don’t is precisely because they are
illegal . . . . Second, keeping drugs out of the hands of children is the
best way to prevent drug addiction generally, as study after study has
confirmed that if we keep a child drug free until age 21, the chances
of use in adulthood are next to zero. Third, we don’t need to guess at
hypothetical legalization schemes. Our experience with legally
prescribed narcotics has already proven it, and we now have an
epidemic. This, despite doing everything the theorists have asked,
from oversight to regulation to prescription requirements.
William J. Bennett, Why Barney Frank and Ron Paul Are Wrong on Drug
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however, does not absolve decision makers from the responsibility
of making tough choices.102 Here, The Wire’s distinctive point of
view comes through. Even though careful to show not only the
successes but also the dark side of Hamsterdam, The Wire clearly
nets out on the side that legalization represents a better policy
approach than prohibition.103 Through the framing of the
narrative, the audience joins in this conclusion:
Viewers follow the highs and lows of Hamsterdam all season
long, becoming increasingly invested in the experiment’s
success. We have become frustrated with the failures of the
police department and, like Colvin, see Hamsterdam as a
potential, though radical, solution. But by the season finale,
Hamsterdam is crawling with indignant reporters and
politicians looking to capitalize on the self-destructive choices
of others. We see Deputy Commissioner William Rawls joyfully
give the order “Over the top gentlemen!” as he blares “Flight of
the Valkyries” from his squad car—a nod to the famous scene
in Francis Ford Coppola’s Apocalypse Now (1979) in which
American soldiers appear to enjoy firebombing a village of
Vietnamese women and children. In the version of this scene
in The Wire, hoppers and junkies are tackled mid-run, squad
cars corner their prey, and one addict is even pulled out of a
vacant building with his pants down. The viewer witnesses an
orgy of supposed justice both at the street level and from
above, since local news stations have deployed helicopters to
capture the story.104

Legalization, CNN (June 30, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-30/opinion/
bennett.drug.legalization_1_drug-legalization-illegal-drugs-drug-rehab-center?_
s=PM:OPINION (last visited Dec. 21, 2011) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
102. See Alasdair McMillan, Heroism, Institutions, and the Police
Procedural, in THE WIRE: URBAN DECAY AND AMERICAN TELEVISION, supra note
23, at 55–56 (“Unlike the simple homicide cases that are the staples of most
[police] procedurals, drug cases in The Wire offer no easy cathartic resolution.”).
Part of The Wire’s realism lies in its refusal to cater to the typical television
device of a happy, settled ending. Id. Real life is not so simple.
103. See The Wire: Reformation, supra note 15 (containing Colvin’s
supervisor’s reaction to Hamsterdam: “I got to give it to you, a brilliant idea.
Insane and illegal, but stone fuckin’ brilliant nonetheless”).
104. Amanda Ann Klein, “The Dickensian Aspect”: Melodrama, Viewer
Engagement, and the Socially Conscious Text, in THE WIRE: URBAN DECAY AND
AMERICAN TELEVISION, supra note 23, at 182.
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The case for legalization made by The Wire in dramatic form
has also been advanced by many scholars and commentators.105
The former mayor of Baltimore, Kurt Schmoke, has also argued
in favor of legalization.106 Proponents of this new approach see in
decriminalization the promise of less violence—here and
abroad,107 a decrease in the spread of AIDS,108 the reduction of
property crime committed by drug addicts,109 treatment of these
105. See BUCKLEY, supra note 13, at 405 (“A conservative should evaluate
the practicality of a legal constriction . . . . I came to the conclusion that the socalled war on drugs was not working, and . . . we should look into what effects
that war has, a canvass of the casualties.”); DUKE & GROSS, supra note 101, at
231 (“Drug prohibition has not worked in the past, does not work now and will
not work in the future. Recognition of that truth eventually will force drugpolicy makers to legalize or at least de facto decriminalize the drugs now
prohibited.”); Harp, supra note 13, at 1692 (“[W]ere drugs legal, Mexican cartels
and their ilk would be bankrupted overnight. No one would buy a single gram of
roughly processed, contaminated drugs off the street . . . . The black market
would cease to exist. With one stroke, the war in Mexico would be ended.”)
SCHLOSSER, supra note 13, at 73 (arguing that decriminalizing marijuana is “the
first step toward a rational drug policy” and would cause immediate benefits,
including diverting law enforcement resources and funds to addressing more
serious and dangerous crimes); Erik G. Luna, Our Vietnam: The Prohibition
Apocalypse, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 483, 484–85 (1997) (“The drug war . . . is
championed by the gentry of a previous generation. They are unmoved by
empirical data and pragmatic suggestions; anything short of absolute
prohibition is deemed ‘morally scandalous.’ Rhetoric replaces reason, while lurid
claims drown out scientific evidence.”).
106. See Kurt L. Schmoke, An Argument in Favor of Decriminalization, 18
HOFSTRA L. REV. 501, 506 (1990) (arguing that prohibiting drugs “has not only
failed to solve the drug abuse problem, but has made the problem worse” and
recommending “a measured and carefully implemented program of drug
decriminalization based on the public health system”). Schmoke observes:
[T]wo inescapable facts . . . have persistently hampered the federal
government’s attempts to stamp out narcotics use through
prohibition. First, drug addiction is a disease and addicts need
medical care. Second, in the absence of access to legitimate sources of
drugs, addicts will look to the criminal underworld for the drugs they
cannot otherwise obtain.
Id. at 501–02.
107. See Harp, supra note 13, at 1670 (explaining that violence is “the only
mechanism for adjudicating contractual disputes and enforcing industry norms”
in black markets). If drugs were legal, then violence would decrease because
“[t]here would be nothing to fight over.” Id. at 1692.
108. See Mamber, supra note 16, at 637 (arguing that “[t]he current zerotolerance criminalization policy has created a catastrophic public health crisis”
because the lack of access to clean needles causes AIDS to spread).
109. See BUCKLEY, supra note 13, at 407 (estimating the value of goods
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same addicts,110 reimaging of law-enforcement priorities,111 and a
cessation to the mass incarceration of American citizens.112
Prohibition prevents the realization of these goals because it
drives both drug dealers and drug users underground, where
violence—not law—sets the governing norms.113 Hamsterdam’s
second lesson crystallizes around this point: Regulation succeeds
where criminalization fails because legal markets are much
easier to control through the use of law than are black markets.114
This insight has relevance for attempts to deal with the
economic distress that accompanies many low-value, fringe
markets. For example, in the context of repetitive payday
lending, one of the most persistent trouble spots of the fringe
economy, there are four broad policy options:
First, policymakers might conclude that the market is
inherently objectionable, and thus that laws should be enacted
that in practice prohibit payday lending . . . . Second,
policymakers might conclude that the industry should be
tolerated, but only if it can succeed without depending on a
regular practice of repetitive lending. Third, policymakers
might conclude that, on balance, the market should be
tolerated but that the potential for abuse is sufficient to justify
some form of intrusion or supervision of the market. . . .
[Fourth,] [w]e note in passing the possibility that policymakers
might conclude that the costs of any plausible regulatory
stolen by addicts to be $10 billion in property and $1,000 in each victim’s pain).
110. See SCHLOSSER, supra note 13, at 73 (suggesting that funds currently
used to prosecute marijuana dealers can be diverted to providing substanceabuse treatment).
111. See BUCKLEY, supra note 13, at 407 (estimating if drugs were legalized,
then 400,000 policemen could focus on other criminal activities).
112. See id. at 408–09 (arguing that “civil justice” calls for drug policies that
consider the negative effects that illegalization has on law-abiding citizens, as
well as the “astonishing legal weapons” available to prosecute drug possession
which could be diverted to prosecuting other crimes); Mamber, supra note 16, at
629 (“[Z]ero-tolerance criminalization policy . . . has created a whole new set of
problems, including . . . an overcrowded prison system filled disproportionately
with people of color.”).
113. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (explaining the important
role of violence in regulating the illegal drug market); DUKE & GROSS, supra note
101, at 110–13 (describing how illegal drug markets give rise to systemic
violence and proliferation of deadly weapons).
114. See DUKE & GROSS, supra note 101, at 105 (concluding from a historical
review of drug policy that “[o]ur prohibition experiment roiled up what had been
a relatively benign drug market”).
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intervention are likely to exceed the benefits, and thus, that no
regulation is appropriate. This approach has not found favor in
any jurisdiction of which we are aware . . . .115

In assessing this cafeteria of choices—prohibition of the
market, prohibition of certain products in the market, regulation,
or laissez faire—Hamsterdam cautions against the first two
categories of proposals that institute blanket bans on particular
markets or certain products in the market.116 And in fact most
states do follow the third model of regulation.117 Still, there is a
growing number of calls to ban the practice of payday lending.118
Given the questionable practices of many payday lenders, the
impulse to ban payday lending outright has obvious appeal.119
But banning a market leaves demand unchanged, and this
demand too often leads consumers to even more unsavory
markets than the one just outlawed.120 Even when thwarted
payday borrowers do not descend into the black market to utilize
the services of loan sharks, prohibition of payday lending still
produces other dire financial outcomes for the people whom goodintentioned reformers hope to help.121 States such as Georgia and

115. Mann & Hawkins, supra note 13, at 880–81.
116. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
117. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 13, at 881 (explaining that
“[r]egulated tolerance of some form has been chosen in the bulk of American
jurisdictions”).
118. See Christopher Choe, Bringing in the Unbanked Off the Fringe: The
Bank on San Francisco Model and the Need for Public and Private Partnership,
8 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 365, 394 (2009) (describing recent legislative efforts
“to effectively ban, or severely limit, payday lending by capping APR”); Robert
H. Frank, Payday Loans Are a Scourge, But Should Wrath Be Aimed at the
Lenders?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at C4 (arguing that “easy credit access” is
like “heroin and cocaine” and that pressure should be applied to legislators to
change laws).
119. See Choe, supra note 118, at 394 (stating that voters in several states
recently approved measures to ban payday lending).
120. See Zywicki, supra note 76, at 456 (explaining studies showing that
“stricter regulation of consumer credit, and thus reduced access by higher-risk
borrowers to legal credit” increases the incidences of loan-sharking).
121. In this regard, prohibition encompasses more than a simple ban.
Sometimes regulations erect barriers so high that they make a market
impossible and create a quasi-prohibition, which has the same effect of driving
people to different markets. See Hawkins, supra note 76, at 2108 (discussing
usury limits as effective bans).
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North Carolina that have banned payday lending outright have
seen these negative effects of prohibition firsthand:
Georgians and North Carolinians do not seem better off since
their states outlawed payday credit: they have bounced more
checks, complained more about lenders and debt collectors,
and have filed for Chapter 7 (“no asset”) bankruptcy at a
higher rate. The increase in bounced checks represents a
potentially huge transfer from depositors to banks and credit
unions. Banning payday loans did not save Georgian
households $154 million per year, as the [Center for
Responsible Lending] projected, it cost them millions per year
in returned check fees.122

Virginia had a similar experience. When it banned payday
loans, the unintended consequence was to promote the growth of
the car-title lending industry.123
Nor would banning auto-title loans solve the problem that
arose in Virginia. Todd Zywicki describes how the same
phenomenon witnessed in North Carolina, Georgia, and Virginia
in the aftermath of payday-lending bans would work in
jurisdictions that decide to ban auto-title loans:
Prohibiting the option of auto title loans is likely to harm the
very borrowers that such regulation is intended to help. For
moderate income consumers, a ban on title lending will likely
lead to a shift to payday lending or greater use of revolving
credit. Unbanked consumers will likely substitute pawnshops
or rent-to-own to try to make ends meet. Banked consumers
are likely to see little reduction in their access to credit, but
instead just a substitution to greater use of a different type of
credit. In fact, by pushing consumers to use credit that is less
appropriate for their personal situation (such as revolving
credit with substantial behavior-based fees), banked
consumers are more likely to run into financial collapse than
they would be with a title loan. Unbanked consumers may see
a reduction in credit availability, resulting in more bounced
checks, more utility shutoffs, and more evictions stemming
from an inability to pay rent. It is hard to see how this
122. DONALD P. MORGAN & MICHAEL R. STRAIN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.,
STAFF REPORT NO. 309, PAYDAY HOLIDAY: HOW HOUSEHOLDS FARE AFTER PAYDAY
CREDIT BANS 26 (rev. 2008).
123. See Jim Hawkins, The Federal Government in the Fringe Economy, 15
CHAP. L. REV. 23, 75 n.297 (2011) (describing Virginia’s example and predicting
similar results in Arizona following its payday lending ban).
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combination of consequences—greater use of pawnshops, more
bounced checks, and more utility shutoffs—can improve
consumer welfare.124

Solutions such as prohibition that simultaneously leave
demand untouched and prohibit legal outlets for that demand to be
satisfied simply kick the can down the road to markets even lower
on the desirability scale.125 In the same way, destroying
Hamsterdam makes nice headlines and helps the public feel better
about itself, but it does not improve the conditions in the inner city
and in fact makes them worse.126 Prohibition and progress are not
one and the same.
Many alternatives abound. The historic response to payday
lending suggests a number of creative possibilities apart from
prohibition that are available to fringe economy policymakers. The
first major push in the United States to attack the problem of
payday lending occurred in the 1920s.127 This reform movement,
which was largely successful, had five different areas of attack:
(1) expanding—not constricting—access to payday products
through elimination of prohibitive usury laws, thereby bringing
mainstream lenders into the market; (2) heavy regulatory
oversight, including licensing in exchange for usury-rate
exemptions; (3) greater transparency—judicially enforced where
necessary—of true interest rates; (4) education through the media;
and (5) the use of charitable nonprofits to meet market demand
whenever possible.128 These types of initiatives align with the
Hamsterdam model of containment through regulation. From a
policymaking perspective, the goal should be to find the regulatory
sweet spot that allows for meaningful regulation while at the same
time maintaining enough incentives for fringe businesses to
maintain the market that consumers demand.129 By keeping
124. Zywicki, supra note 76, at 447–48.
125. See id. at 427 (“Well-intentioned but fundamentally misguided
paternalistic regulation that deprives consumers of access to title loans would
likely force many borrowers to turn to even more expensive lenders, illegal
lenders, or to do without emergency funds.”).
126. Supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text.
127. Allison S. Woolston, Note, Neither Borrower Nor Lender Be: The Future
of Payday Lending in Arizona, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 853, 886 (2010).
128. Id.
129. See Hawkins, supra note 76, at 2101–17 (laying out a number of
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markets legal, problems remain aboveground, which allows for the
possibility of a regulatory solution.130
Perhaps the lasting importance of Hamsterdam, however, lies
not in how it answers the policy question of regulation versus
prohibition. Its importance, instead, may center on how it changes
the terms of the debate. The criminalization model presupposes
that the War on Drugs is something that can be “won.”131 The Wire
says, “Not so.”132 The inevitability of markets discussed in Part II
supports this viewpoint. By using the power of drama to question
this prevailing premise of the criminalization model, Hamsterdam
introduces the possibility of using new and innovative solutions to
attack age-old problems.133 In this regard, Hamsterdam may not
be the right answer, but at least it initiates a dialogue as to what
that answer might be. The promising opportunities offered by
thinking outside the box in this manner are not limited to the drug
war, but apply to many other low-value markets as well. Just
because a market offers low-utility goods or services does not mean
that the market should automatically be prohibited.134 Sometimes
the cure is worse than the disease.
V. Hamsterdam and the Politics of Prohibition
It has long been said that politics is the art of the possible.135
The Wire turns this old adage on its side. In the world of The Wire,
promising proposals as part of an exhaustive analysis of the rent-to-own
industry).
130. This possibility itself is significant. One of the chief drawbacks of any
prohibition regime is that its one-size-fits-all model hampers attempts to testrun possible new solutions toward the problem being addressed. See Ilya Somin,
Gonzales v. Raich: Federalism as a Casualty of the War of Drugs, 15 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 507, 540, 548 (2006) (noting the experiences of the War on
Drugs and Prohibition as precluding decentralized experimentation).
131. See DUKE & GROSS, supra note 101, at 200 (stating that the “goal of the
drug war is ‘a drug free society’”).
132. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text.
133. See David M. Alff, Yesterday’s Tomorrow Today: Baltimore and the
Promise of Reform, in THE WIRE: URBAN DECAY AND AMERICAN TELEVISION, supra
note 23, at 30 (“[T]he aggressively original Hamsterdam project constituted the
most radical and successful police intervention depicted in The Wire.”).
134. See supra notes 120–30 and accompanying text.
135. See JONATHAN STEINBERG, BISMARCK: A LIFE 472 (2011) (quoting Otto
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politics limits that which is possible.136 Hamsterdam works.
Indeed, it is the first thing to have worked in the drug war for a
long time, and no one in the know in Baltimore disputes this
remarkable success.137 But this tragedy remains: the success of
Bunny Colvin’s experiment is totally and completely irrelevant.
Hamsterdam fails—and is doomed to fail from its very
inception—because no political leader has the courage to come to
its defense, even after seeing the transformation the free zones
have brought to West Baltimore.138 Ambition, not the best
interests of the community, trumps all considerations.139 A telling
scene occurs when Tommy Carcetti asks his campaign manager,
Theresa D’Agostino, “Fuck the politics for a moment. What if
[Colvin] happens to be right?” D’Agostino’s response: “Come on,
Tommy, they dealt you a winning hand and you’re acting like you
forgotten how to play.”140 She knows Tommy too well. Carcetti
plays his hand, Hamsterdam is soon history, Carcetti becomes
mayor and eventually governor.141
The unwillingness of Baltimore’s leaders to embrace success
embodies the institutional failure that sits at the core of The
Wire’s being.142 In the words of David Simon:
Whatever institution you as an individual commit to will
somehow find a way to betray you on The Wire. Unless of
Von Bismarck as stating “politics [i]s the art of the possible”).
136. See Alff, supra note 133, at 26 (explaining that Tommy Carcetti, whose
character provides the “principal political plot line,” effectively “perpetuate[s] a
historic status quo”).
137. Supra notes 39, 72–73 and accompanying text.
138. See Alff, supra note 133, at 31–32 (describing how Carcetti succeeds in
causing Hamsterdam’s destruction through political rhetoric rather than
substantive critiques).
139. See id. at 35 (“While none of Carcetti’s policies reforms Baltimore
permanently, each contributes to [his] statewide self-promotion and eventual
election as governor.”).
140. The Wire: Mission Accomplished, supra note 8.
141. Id. (Hamsterdam’s demolition); The Wire: Unto Others, supra note 48
(Carcetti becomes mayor); The Wire: –30–, supra note 48 (Carcetti’s
gubernatorial election).
142. See Ted Nannicelli, It’s All Connected: Televisual Narrative Complexity,
in THE WIRE: URBAN DECAY AND AMERICAN TELEVISION, supra note 23, at 193,
202 n.3 (stating that The Wire gives an “unequivocal answer” to the question of
whether society’s largest institutions are capable of reform, “which is apparent
as Colvin surveys the wreckage of his bulldozed social experiment”).
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course you’re willing to play the game without regard to the
effect on others or society as a whole, in which case you might
be a judge or the state police superintendent or governor one
day.143

Colvin acts selflessly and suffers banishment.144 Carcetti
pursues his self-interest with reckless abandon and becomes
governor.145 Juxtaposing the divergent career trajectories of
Colvin and Carcetti underscores the third lesson that
Hamsterdam teaches: Mustering the political will to provide legal
sanction to low-value markets is a difficult, if not impossible, task.
Politicians lack courage because they value advancement and
job security over the public interest.146 Taking a risky position
politically—even when it is the right thing to do from a normative
standpoint—invites opportunistic opponents to use this position
against risk takers as a weapon in future electoral contests.147
This self-preservation instinct—which Simon describes as
“something hollow and ugly at our institutional core”148—blocks
the possibility of meaningful reform.
The failure of politics on display here is a failure to deal with
reality.149 From this perspective, the divide between Colvin and
143. Heather Havrilesky, David Simon on Cutting “The Wire,” SALON.COM
(Mar. 10, 2008, 9:00AM), http://www.salon.com/entertainment/tv/feature/2008/
03/10/simon (last visited Dec. 22, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
144. Supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
145. Supra notes 139–41 and accompanying text.
146. See William F. Zorzi, The Politics of Baltimore, in THE WIRE: TRUTH BE
TOLD, supra note 4, at 273 (“[T]he politics practiced by Carcetti and others in
the Establishment didn’t seem to lend itself to the life-and-death questions that
the street world and police work often deal with. Yet it is exactly that machinery
that pulls the strings.”).
147. The bipartisan unwillingness in Washington, D.C. to address
entitlement reform represents a current example of this type of profile in no
courage. See Philip Klein, The Politics of Entitlement Reform, AMERICAN
SPECTATOR, Nov. 2006, at 54 (explaining why neither political party will
promote entitlement reform, despite the urgent need for reform).
148. Simon, supra note 22, at 5; see also Alasdair McMillan, Dramatizing
Individuation: Institutions, Assemblages, and The Wire, CINEPHILE 42–49
(Summer 2008) (arguing that The Wire is “one of the most profound artistic
statements since Kafka of the individual condition—and the conditions of
individuation—in a society dominated by dysfunctional institutions”).
149. See Alff, supra note 133, at 33 (arguing that the politicians on The Wire
rely heavily on optimistic rhetoric, but “fail[] to answer the challenges of twenty-
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Baltimore’s political class in The Wire mirrors the divide between
economics and politics. Economics is about making choices in a
world of scarcity.150 Choosing to do one thing has downstream
consequences that limit choices in other areas.151 Politics, on the
other hand, pretends that these trade-offs do not exist—that the
attractive choice is easy and free of collateral costs.152 In this way,
politics simplifies problems to appeal to as many voters as
possible. Such simplification, while perhaps comforting to some,
does not alter the fundamental reality that choices have
consequences:
Politics offers attractive solutions but economics can offer only
trade-offs. For example, when laws are proposed to restrict the
height of apartment buildings in a community, politics
presents the issue in terms of whether we prefer tall buildings
or buildings of more modest height in our town. Economics
asks what you are prepared to trade off in order to keep the
height of buildings below some specified level. In places where
land costs may equal or exceed the cost of the apartment
buildings themselves, the difference between allowing tenstory buildings to be built and allowing a maximum of five
stories may be that rents will be twice as high in the shorter
buildings. The question then is not simply whether you prefer
shorter buildings but how much do you prefer shorter
buildings and what price are you prepared to pay to mandate
height restrictions in your community. A doubling of rents and
three additional highway fatalities per year? A tripling of
rents and six additional highway fatalities per year?
Economics cannot answer such questions. It can only make
you aware of a need to ask them.153

first century urban management”).
150. See LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF
ECONOMIC SCIENCE 16 (2d ed. 1935) (providing the classic definition that
“[e]conomics is the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship
between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses”).
151. See SOWELL, supra note 60, at 2 (explaining that economic thinking
focuses on the costs and consequences of different choices).
152. See id. (stating that “[p]olitical thinking tends to conceive of
policies . . . in terms of their hoped-for results” rather than the incentives and
constraints those policies create). “Many of the ‘unintended consequences’ of
policies and programs would have been foreseeable from the outset if these
processes had been analyzed in terms of the incentives and constraints they
created.” Id. at 2–3.
153. Id. at 127.
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Back to Hamsterdam. Colvin implicitly realizes that the
reality of market forces—in particular, the demand for drugs and
the corresponding supply that rises to meet such demand—
creates the need to ask radical questions as to whether the
criminalization approach to the drug war is worth the
corresponding trade-offs. But he is thinking like an economist in
a politician’s world, and that portends his downfall.154
The narrative of politics has no time to engage in a debate of
such nuance as that presented by the concept of Hamsterdam.
Political rhetoric is always incomplete and one-sided.155
Explaining the concept of the free zones and why they might
work to an average voter is a daunting task.156 The converse is
not true. Taking a hard line against drugs is tailor-made for a
political world propelled by sound bites:
To politicians in search of sound opinions and sustained
applause, the war on drugs presents itself as a gift from
heaven . . . . The war against drugs provides them with
something to say that offends nobody, requires them to do
nothing difficult, and allows them to postpone, perhaps
154. In short, Colvin refuses to play The Game. See McMillan, supra note
148, at 46 (explaining that the “institutional command to ‘play the game’ is a
recurrent theme in The Wire” and entails “docile obedience” to your leaders).
Rather, Colvin “tries to effect positive change the only way he can in such a
broken system, by an outright refusal to obey or enforce its dysfunctional brand
of discipline.” McMillan, supra note 102, at 58.
155. See Alff, supra note 133, at 32 (arguing that Carcetti’s critique of
Hamsterdam was “a nebulous rhetorical gesture to the limits of toleration,”
providing no alternative policy options and ignoring practical considerations).
156. The example of former Baltimore mayor Kurt Schmoke, now Dean of
Howard Law School, is instructive. As mayor, Schmoke advocated liberalizing
drug laws and treating the drug problem as a public health issue. See supra
note 106. His career suffered in the aftermath. See ALVAREZ, supra note 4, at
205. Schmoke actually appears in The Wire as a Baltimore health commissioner
at the end of Season 3 in connection with the Hamsterdam story arc. Id. at 278.
As Mayor Royce considers whether Hamsterdam has any political viability,
Schmoke’s character both encourages and warns Royce: “I really think you’re on
to something here, [Mayor], but if you keep it up, before you know it, they’ll be
calling you the most dangerous man in America.” The Wire: Middle Ground,
supra note 7. In this moment, fiction and reality merge, as Schmoke himself was
branded “the most dangerous man in America” when he was mayor of Baltimore
for his views on legalizing drugs. Adam Rosen, An Interview with Kurt Schmoke,
GELFMAGAZINE.COM (Jan. 28, 2008), http://www.gelfmagazine.com/archives/an_
interview_with_kurt_schmoke.php (last visited Dec. 22, 2011) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).

DRUG MARKETS, FRINGE MARKETS

887

indefinitely, the more urgent and specific questions about the
state of the nation’s schools, housing, employment
opportunities for young black men—i.e., the conditions to
which drug addiction speaks as a tragic symptom, not a
cause. . . . The war on drugs thus becomes the perfect war for
people who would rather not fight a war, a war in which the
politicians who stand so fearlessly on the side of the good, the
true, and the beautiful need do nothing else but strike noble
poses as protectors of the people and defenders of the public
trust.157

The quest by politicians for simple and attractive answers
that can be easily presented to voters also explains the obsession
of Baltimore’s leaders with lowering crime statistics.158 The
politicians see lowering the crime rate as a formula for ensuring
electoral success.159 That the numbers are built on a facade does
not matter when maintaining power constitutes the overriding
consideration.160 Everything is about the votes.
157. Lewis H. Lapham, A Political Opiate: The War on Drugs Is a Folly and
a Menace, HARPER’S MAG., Dec. 1989, at 43, 44–45. This desire to pander to
public opinion is precisely what leads to Hamsterdam’s death: “[Hamsterdam]
has mixed consequences, but, true to form, it is ultimately the public spectacle of
the drug zone, rather than any internal problems, that lead to its demise. The
best efforts of a group of professionals are undone by politicians who exploit this
spectacle to further their careers.” Brooks, supra note 96, at 77 n.5.
158. See ALVAREZ, supra note 4, at 212 (stating that in the lead-up to
Baltimore’s 2002 election, police “were being pressured to reduce crime statistics
by any means necessary, resulting in the wholesale manipulation of those
statistics”). The manipulation of crime statistics is not a practice unique to
Baltimore. See CHRISTOPHER P. WILSON, COP KNOWLEDGE: POLICE POWER AND
CULTURAL NARRATIVE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 146 (2000) (“Many police
departments in our time, of course, have become fully cognizant that effective
crime busting can actually lead to the appearance of higher crime rates, which
can then be used against them by a cost-conscious public and publicity-conscious
mayors.”).
159. ALVAREZ, supra note 4, at 212.
160. Id. Cedric Daniels—a stalwart cop in the universe of The Wire—
becomes police commissioner near the end of the series and refuses to play the
“stats game”:
I’ll swallow a lie when I have to. I’ve swallowed a few big ones lately.
But the stats game? That lie? It’s what ruined this department.
Shining up shit and calling it gold, so majors become colonels and
mayors become governors. Pretending to do police work, while one
generation fucking trains the next how not to do the job.
The Wire: –30–, supra note 48. The tenure of Daniels is a short one. He cannot
change The Game, and he refuses to play, surprising everyone by choosing to
resign instead. Id.
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By limiting that which is possible, politics, as seen through
the eyes of The Wire, serves as a roadblock to dealing with
pressing social and economic issues such as the drug war. This
limiting function has broader implications, including attempts for
dealing with other disreputable markets that operate on the
fringes of the economy. The analogy is not perfect. The War on
Drugs invites an emotional response from the public—sometimes
with racial overtones—in a way that the practices of payday
lending or auto-title loans do not.161 Protecting children, too, often
sits as the center of public debates about drugs—a fact that
heightens the political risks of taking anything less than a
hardline approach to the drug problem.162 These distinctions
between the drug war and the fringe economy make ideas such as
Hamsterdam a much tougher sell to the voting public than any
similar proposals addressed toward the woes of the fringe
economy.163 In fact, that the businesses in the fringe economy
legally exist at all demonstrates a fundamental difference in
public attitudes toward drug markets vis-à-vis fringe markets.164
In many ways, therefore, Hamsterdam as a policy approach—
legalization with significant government oversight—already
exists in the world of the fringe economy.165 The end result is that
policymakers have greater room to maneuver politically in
dealing with the likes of payday lenders than they do with drug
dealers.
161. See ANDERSON, supra note 61, at 120 (discussing how unemployment,
racial prejudices, dislocation, and destitution cause many inner-city African
Americans to join the drug trade); Mamber, supra note 16, at 629 (stating that
the drug war created “an overcrowded prison system filled disproportionately
with people of color”).
162. See Bennett, supra note 101 (placing children front-and-center of the
dialogue on drug prohibition). Bennett’s point may be fundamentally sound; it is
certainly politically savvy. By framing the drug war as a means to protect
children, Bennett immediately puts his pro-legalization foes on the defensive,
forcing them to debate their position on his terms, namely the effect of
legalization on “the children.” Because the political benefit of advocating
decriminalization is practically nil, the self-serving politician will naturally
think, “Why bother?”
163. See KARGER, supra note 13, at 36–37 (explaining how the fringe
economy has gained cultural acceptance as both poor and middle-class families
use fringe products).
164. Id.
165. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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These caveats, however, do not mean that the third lesson of
Hamsterdam lacks relevance in the discussion of low-value, but
otherwise legal, markets. Businesses that operate on the fringe
remain unsympathetic and easy to demonize as they are
perceived as deceptive, cost prohibitive, abusive, and predatory.166
The lack of popularity of these industries with the general public
extends to regulators and other policymakers who have used—for
reasons that are unclear—the present economic distress to take a
closer look at fringe lenders.167 Courts, scholars, and journalists
likewise take a dim view of fringe-economy operators.168 From a
risk–reward calculus then, there exists little political upside for
elected officials to advocate liberalizing policies toward fringe
economic players, even if such policies promote the public good.169
Industries such as payday lenders, anticipatory lenders, car-title
lenders, pawnshops, and rent-to-own stores simply have no
enduring constituency.170
The combination of an unpopular industry and prohibition as
a common policy tool of choice creates a scenario where
politicians will opt for the easy answer of either banning fringe
economic products or enacting overly burdensome regulations,
which amounts to the same thing.171 Prohibition and consumer
protection, however, are not synonymous.172 But the merits do not
166. See Hawkins, supra note 123, at 61 (stating that political rhetoric used
to justify regulations often suggests that creditors confuse and deceive
customers, employing “tricks and traps”).
167. See Zywicki, supra note 76, at 425 (noting that “the onset of the
financial crisis has spurred renewed scrutiny of nontraditional lending products,
even though there is no suggestion—much less evidence—that those products
contributed to the crisis, and indeed, may be playing a positive role in
mitigating the fallout from the crisis”).
168. Hawkins, supra note 76, at 2044 (analyzing the rent-to-own industry
and concluding that academics, courts, and journalists justify regulation based
simply on the high price of rent-to-own transactions).
169. See KARGER, supra note 13, at 200–02 (discussing the lack of incentives
for politicians and government officials to implement effective reforms).
170. See id. at 209–11 (detailing the attacks these fringe industries
currently face and comparing them to the large financial institutions entering
the fringe sector with established political clout).
171. See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text.
172. See KARGER, supra note 13, at 198–99 (explaining that prohibiting
fringe economy products fails to protect consumers and arguing that effective
consumer protection should include regulatory reforms).
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matter. The third lesson of Hamsterdam instructs us that
political outcomes, not policy outcomes, drive decisions relating to
perceived low-value markets. It takes a special brand of political
courage for a public official to say: “Payday loans, car-title loans,
and rent-to-own furniture can serve useful functions.” Such a
message seems completely counterintuitive to our normal course
of thinking where the dominant media narrative “decrie[s] fringe
creditors as unscrupulous, rapacious, notorious, unconscionable,
like crack, and the worst actors.”173 The prospect of swimming
against this tide, which offers no political advantage and
significant political risk, will dissuade politicians from
undertaking the hard work of crafting nuanced regulatory
solutions to the problems of fringe markets.174
The three lessons of Hamsterdam thus converge to paint a
dark picture for the future of regulation in the fringe economy.
While prohibition is usually the least effective solution, it
remains the easiest to implement—a blunt instrument that is
politically, rhetorically, and emotionally easy to sell.175 In a world
where the persistence of demand creates available markets,
consumers respond to prohibition by moving underground to
obtain that which the law forbids them to acquire aboveground,
almost always with worse results.176 Consequently, while
politicians who demonize fringe lenders and limit their ability to
operate can point to these efforts as signs of their caring and
compassion, the lives of their constituents—much like the lives of
the citizens left behind in West Baltimore in Hamsterdam’s
wake—continue to suffer long after the cheap political points
have been scored.177 This perpetual elevation of spin over
substance leaves communities impoverished, with no hope of
change.
The drama of Hamsterdam uses the issue of the drug war to
capture this angst, but the story is just a vehicle to make a larger
173. See Hawkins, supra note 123, at 76 (citing examples of rhetoric using
these words to describe fringe lenders).
174. See id. at 24–25 (arguing, based on empirical research, that political
motivations for increasing federal regulations “fail[ed] to comprehend fringe
banking transactions and their effects”).
175. See supra notes 156–60 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 74–77, 120–21 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text.
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point. Ultimately, the moral of Hamsterdam is not about
legalizing drugs; it is about the structural inability of government
to respond to pressing social challenges:
Even if The Wire focuses on particular failing institutions, it
implicitly makes a deeper point about institutions as such. As
a society, our response to most problems that require collective
action is to set up institutions that provide constraints and
incentives to help align self-interest with the goal in question.
Unfortunately, complex problems, such as education or crime,
cannot be perfectly captured by institutional design. The gap
between the incentives and constraints established by any
institution and the goals it is meant to serve leaves a space for
self-interest to subvert the original purpose of the institution.
The Wire illustrates this tendency by showing its extreme
manifestations in the war on drugs, in the public school
system, and in democratic politics. . . . The Wire shows
that . . . today’s problems are simply the eventual outcome of
our public institutions’ internal logic. By setting up internal
institutional games, one ensures that they will tend to corrupt
themselves, subverting their original goals by their very
operation.178

Institutional failure of this type on a mass scale paralyzes
the prospect of progress and renders the engine of democracy a
tool of self-interest at the expense of the collective good.179
And that is a lesson that has far-reaching consequences, for
the fringe economy and beyond.

178.
179.

Mark, supra note 26.
Id.; Nannicelli, supra note 142.

